Publications
Stump, J. 2020. “On Socrates’ Project of Philosophical Conversion”. Philosophers’ Imprint 20 (32): 1-19.
It is often thought that Plato is pessimistic about Socrates’ project of changing what his interlocutors value the most. I argue that the three most common arguments that scholars use to support this interpretation are either inconclusive or rely on misinterpretations of the text. I then develop and defend the view that Socrates is trying to change his interlocutors’ values not so much by arguing them into adopting new ones as by preparing them to have a certain emotional experience, one that can be effective at changing their beliefs about how best to live.
Stump, J. 2022. “Moving and Looking". American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 6: 74-79.
In Progress
“Two Kinds of Eros in Plato”
There is much disagreement about what eros is for Plato and whether it plays a significant role in his moral psychology. I argue that eros is the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful, but there are two kinds of it: the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful in the particular way of causing a certain sort of pleasure, and the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful in the particular way of being central to happiness. The first kind of eros is aroused solely by perception. The second kind develops over time, and it is a matter of whether a person is able to structure their evaluative beliefs to be consistent with valuing the desired object more than anything else. In everyone, this is a process of motivated reasoning.
“On Socrates’ Erotic Art”
In the Phaedrus, Socrates’ claims to have an erotic art (τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι τέχνην, 257a). What is it? Is it really a techne? (Yes.)
“The Importance for Plato of What People Value”
Plato thinks that the most important psychological fact about a person is what they value the most. However, there is no precise understanding of Plato’s conception of valuing (epimeleisthai). I survey all of the instances of epimeleisthai in writings prior to and contemporary with Plato. I argue that, despite initial appearances to the contrary, epimeleisthai is a unified notion: to epimeleisthai something is to believe that it is important for you, and, on the basis of that, to pay attention to it and take care of it. I show that this is also Plato’s conception of epimeleisthai but with one important twist. It is that knowing what something is, and thus being able to define it, is required to count as having paid attention to it. It is this innovation that allows Socrates to infer that a person does not value something from their being refuted. There is good reason to suppose that this innovation originates with the historical Socrates.