Publications
Stump, J. 2020. “On Socrates’ Project of Philosophical Conversion”. Philosophers’ Imprint 20 (32): 1-19.
It is often thought that Plato is pessimistic about Socrates’ project of changing what his interlocutors value the most. I argue that the three most common arguments that scholars use to support this interpretation are either inconclusive or rely on misinterpretations of the text. I then develop and defend the view that Socrates is trying to change his interlocutors’ values not so much by arguing them into adopting new ones as by preparing them to have a certain emotional experience, one that can be effective at changing their beliefs about how best to live.
Stump, J. 2022. “Moving and Looking". American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 6: 74-79.
What is it to teach philosophy as a way of life? What is it to give students a chance of falling in love with wisdom? I invite the reader to follow me along a path of metaphor, quotations, and reflections on what teaching is actually like.
Stump, J. Forthcoming. “On Socrates’ Erotic Art”. Ergo
In the Phaedrus, Socrates’ claims to have an erotic art (τὴν ἐρωτικήν μοι τέχνην, 257a). What is it? I argue that it is a form of matchmaking, and, contrary to widespread scholarly consensus, that it really is a technē.
In Progress
No More Stoicism
Stoicism says that emotions are the enemy and that you should use your reasoning to defeat them. Many people agree — the way to relate to your emotions is to argue against them until they go away. I disagree. Emotions are not the enemy, and reasoning is not an effective tool of emotional regulation. I propose that, instead of trying to control your emotions, it is more courageous and life-affirming to welcome and accept them. I give instructions on how to develop these as actual skills, using insights from the philosophy of emotions, ancient Daoism and Buddhism, and contemporary mindfulness. This book is meant for a popular audience.
“Two Kinds of Eros in Plato”
There is disagreement about what eros is for Plato and whether it plays a significant role in his moral psychology. I argue that eros is the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful, but there are two kinds of it: the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful in the particular way of causing a certain sort of pleasure, and the desire for an object insofar as it is beautiful in the particular way of being central to happiness. The first kind is based solely on perception. The second kind develops over time, and it is a matter of whether a person is able to structure their evaluative beliefs to be consistent with valuing the desired object more than anything else. In everyone, this is a process of motivated reasoning.
“The Importance for Plato of What People Care About”
Plato thinks the most important ethical action is what a person cares about. However, there is no precise understanding of Plato’s conception of caring about or valuing (epimeleisthai). I survey all of the instances of epimeleisthai in writings prior to and contemporary with Plato. I argue that, despite initial appearances to the contrary, epimeleisthai is a unified notion: to epimeleisthai something is to believe that it is important for you, and, on the basis of that, to pay attention to it and take care of it. I consider the upshots for Plato’s conception of the good life.