Jacob Stump

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1-647-217-7010 (mobile)
Citizenship: US

AOS: Ancient Greek & Roman Philosophy, Ethics
AOC: Moral Psychology, Philosophy of Emotions, Aesthetics

Employment

Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2017-present

Education

PhD in Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2011-2017 (received Nov. 2017)
Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy
Dissertation: *Socratic Method and Moral Motivation*
Committee: Rachel Barney (supervisor), Brad Inwood, James Allen, Tom Hurka

On a widespread view, Plato thinks that Socrates' project of using argument to change his interlocutors' core values is seriously misguided, in part because of certain moral psychological commitments. In my dissertation, I show that, on the contrary, Socrates' strategy is responsive to Plato's moral psychology, and I provide a full account of how, for Plato, argument can be effective at causing a person to value wisdom the most.

BA in Philosophy, Wabash College, 2007-11
Awarded with highest honors

Languages

Ancient Greek (advanced reading proficiency)
Latin (intermediate reading proficiency)
German (intermediate reading and speaking proficiency)
French (intermediate reading proficiency)

Papers under Review

"On Socrates' Project of Philosophical Conversion"
"Ruling Desires and Bodyguard Beliefs in Plato"
"The Other Socratic Method"
"Protreptic and Socrates' Erotic Art"

Awards & Honors

Robinson Graduate Fellowship in Ancient Philosophy, University of Toronto (2016-17)
Awarded to select graduate students conducting research in ancient philosophy.

Connaught International Doctoral Scholarship, University of Toronto (2011-16)
Awarded to 10 international scholars annually to provide an additional stipend for the length of the PhD program.

Martha Lile Love Award for Excellence in Teaching Philosophy, University of Toronto (2015)
Awarded to one graduate student annually for excellence in teaching philosophy.

Lilly Scholarship, Wabash College (2007-11)
Awarded to the three incoming students who show the most potential for leadership and academic excellence (full tuition, room and board).

Rhodes Scholarship, Finalist (2011)

J. Harry Cotton Prize in Philosophy, Wabash College (2011)
Awarded annually to the student judged to have done the best work in philosophy.

Phi Beta Kappa, Wabash College (2010)

Talks

<u>Refereed</u>

"The Other Socratic Method"
APA Central Division Meeting (Symposium session), Denver, 2019
"Teaching Philosophy as a Way of Life via Plato's *Apology*"
AAPT/APA Central Division Meeting, Denver, 2019
"On Socrates' Project of Philosophical Conversion"
APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Diego, 2018
Comments: Suzanne Obdrzalek
"Socratic Refutation and Moral Motivation"
APA Central Division Meeting, Chicago, 2018
Comments: Emily Austin
"Motivated Reasoning in Plato"
APA Central Division Meeting, Kansas City, 2017
Comments: Sarah Jansen

"Refutation and Role-Based Epistemic Duties"
4th Annual Canadian Colloquium for Ancient Philosophy (poster presentation), McMaster University, 2016
"Socratic Exhortation"
Argumentation in Antiquity Conference, Humboldt University of Berlin, 2016
"Plato's Erotic Psychology"
UT-Austin Graduate Conference in Philosophy, UT-Austin, 2016
Yale Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Yale University, 2015
"Associative Properties and Aesthetic Judgment"
European Society of Aesthetics Conference, Dublin, 2015
"Philosophical Conversion: Phaedrus as Case Study"
19th Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference, Harvard University, 2015
"The Role of Shame in Socratic Refutation"
International Plato Society Regional Meeting, University of Michigan, 2012
"Opera, Eternity, and Roger Scruton's 'Present Tense'" (with V. Rogers, Rhodes College)
Time Theories and Music Conference, Ionian University, 2012
"To Phthia: Elenchus and Divinity in the *Crito*"
International Society of Neoplatonic Studies, University of Haifa, 2011

Invited

"Love in Three Metaphors: Intoxication, Sickness, and Birth"
15th Annual Symposium on Love, Philosophy Course Union, University of Toronto, 2019
"Loving Animals and Eating Meat"
Colloquium, Philosophy Course Union, University of Toronto, 2018
"Aristotle's Endoxic 'Method': *Eudemian Ethics* 6.1-2"
Cornell Workshop on the *Eudemian Ethics*, Cornell University, 2015
"Socrates' Project of Value Transformation"
CPAMP Working Group, University of Toronto, 2014
"Plato on *Erōs* and Conversion"
5th Annual Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2014
"Socratic Refutation and the Motivational Power of Shame"
3rd Annual APSN Graduate Conference, Humboldt University of Berlin, 2013
"Time's Two Realms: The A-Series and B-Series Impasse"
Colloquium on Kit Fine, University of Toronto, 2012

INVITED COMMENTS

on Marta Jimenez, "For the Sake of Honor and For the Sake of the Noble in Aristotle"
Workshop on Aristotle's Ethics, Virginia Tech, 2018

on Monte Johnson, "Aristotelian Protreptic in the *Protrepticus*"
Prospective Students & Alumni Colloquium, University of Toronto, 2016
on Marta Jimenez, "Two Kinds of Practical Empiricism in Aristotle's Ethics"
4th Annual Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2013

Works in Progress

"Socratic Refutation and Epistemic Duties" (available upon request)
"The Importance for Plato of What People Care About"
"Loving Animals and Eating Meat"
"Beauty and Aesthetic Merit: Two Currencies of Aesthetic Judgment"

Teaching

As Sole Instructor

Ancient Greek & Roman Philosophy

* Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (University of Toronto; Summer 2014, Fall 2018)
* Aristotle's Ethics (University of Toronto, Fall 2017)

Ethics

* Introduction to Ethics (University of Toronto, Fall 2018)
* Environmental Ethics (University of Toronto; Summer 2015, Fall 2017, Spring 2018)
* Business Ethics (University of Toronto, Spring 2018)
* Cultural Appropriation, White Blindness, & Epistemic Injustice (University of Toronto; Spring 2018, Spring 2019)

History of Philosophy in General

* Philosophy as a Way of Life (University of Toronto, Spring 2018)

Philosophy of Mind

* Philosophy of Emotions (University of Toronto, Spring 2017 & Fall 2017)

Outside of Philosophy

* English Language & Literature (Changchun University of Chinese Medicine; Changchun, China; Fall 2006)

As TA

* Introduction to Ethics (University of Toronto, for T. Hurka, Fall 2015)
* Later Medieval Philosophy (University of Toronto, for D. Black, Spring 2015)
* Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (University of Toronto, for J. Whiting & B. Inwood, Fall 2012 and Spring 2013)
* Moral Motivation & Moral Skepticism (University of Toronto, for B. Wald, Summer 2016)
* Chinese Philosophy (University of Toronto, for V. Shen, Fall 2014)
* Aesthetics (University of Toronto, for M. Kingwell, Spring 2014)
* Literature & Philosophy (University of Toronto, for B. Piercy, Summer 2013)
* Environmental Ethics (University of Toronto, for I. Stefanovic, Spring 2013)
* Philosophy of Human Sexuality (University of Toronto, for P. Serchuk, Summer 2012)
* Introduction to Philosophy (University of Toronto, for D. Hutchinson, Spring 2012)

Additional Teaching Experience

Participant in NEH workshop "Reviving Philosophy as a Way of Life" (Wesleyan, Summer 2018)
Over a two-week period discussed what it means to consider philosophy as a way of life; examined that topic in Confucianism, Buddhism, Stoicism, Skepticism, Kantianism, and Existentialism; and developed techniques for teaching philosophy as a way of life at the undergraduate level.

Leader of Ancient Greek Reading Group on Plato's Moral Psychology (Summer 2018)
Led a reading group designed to improve the Ancient Greek of incoming PhD students.

Lead Writing TA (University of Toronto, Fall 2016 & Spring 2017)
Trained graduate student TAs on how to lead philosophy tutorials and give effective written feedback on student essays, collaborated with colleagues to improve the clarity and design of their writing assignments, and received 20+ hours of training.

Essay Clinician (University of Toronto, Spring 2016)
Led workshops for undergraduate students on how to write philosophy papers, assuming no prior experience; and met individually with 10-15 students per week to give personal instruction on how to improve the clarity and structure of their philosophic writing.

Service

University of Toronto Campus Liaison, Wireless Philosophy (Wi-Phi), 2013-Present
Faculty Sponsor, International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, University of Toronto, 2019
Referee, University of Toronto Graduate Conferences, 2012-2017
Co-organizer (w/ W. Costello & R. Howton), Toronto-Yale Workshop on Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus*, 2015.

Assistant organizer (to J. Whiting), Emotions, Narrative, & the Passage of Time Colloquium, Harvard University, 2013.

Co-organizer (w/ W. Costello & R. Howton), Toronto-Yale Workshop on Aristotle's *De Memoria*, 2012.

REFERENCES

Rachel Barney (supervisor)
Canada Research Chair in Ancient Philosophy & Professor of Philosophy and Classics
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
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Jessica Wilson (teaching reference)
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Dissertation Abstract, *Socratic Method and Moral Motivation*

Jacob Stump

I argue for a novel account of the role of reason and argument in changing a person's values within the context of Plato's dialogues. As philosophers, we tend to think it is possible to cause someone to change her values by reasoning with her. But that is often naïve, as can be seen by the trajectory of many political disputes: one side takes an argument to be persuasive, and the other refuses to accept it. As it happens, this is the exact progression of many Platonic dialogues. Socrates argues that his interlocutor's core values are mistaken, and his interlocutor remains unmoved. This pattern has led many scholars—including Martha Nussbaum, Gregory Vlastos, and Alexander Nehamas—to endorse two broad claims: that Plato thinks argument alone is incapable of reforming a person's life; and that Plato rejects Socrates' project, as outlined in the *Apology*, of using argument to persuade his interlocutors to value wisdom more than money, honor, and everything else. These are distressing upshots for those who want to believe in the power of argument, for, perhaps of all philosophers, Plato is concerned the most with how philosophy can be useful in the public sphere.

Against this standard view, I argue that Plato offers a compelling account of how argument can be effective at causing a person to come to value wisdom the most. I focus on his depiction of Socrates' methods of refutation and exhortation. As has not been appreciated by other scholars, Socrates uses these methods not to advocate wisdom's overriding importance, but rather to motivate pursuing wisdom merely for its instrumental value. In cases of refutation, Socrates shows that his interlocutors fail at their role-based epistemic duties (e.g., *qua* teacher of virtue, one must know what virtue is), thus damaging their reputation and self-esteem. To repair these, they must gain wisdom. In cases of exhortation, Socrates convinces his interlocutors that gaining wisdom is necessary for the sake of succeeding at some non-philosophical goal (e.g., advancing their careers). These tactics are surprising, however, for Socrates does not want his interlocutors to value wisdom merely as a temporary resource; he wants them to dedicate their lives to it. What explains his argumentative restraint?

There are two answers, I argue. One is a point of Platonic moral psychology: due to the influence of ruling desires—which I show to be desires for objects *qua* most productive of happiness—any more ambitious strategy will arouse motivated reasoning, and is thus likely to fail. The other is an empirical observation: often pursuing something only as a means can lead to valuing it as an end. Socrates' strategy, I argue, is to incentivize pursuing wisdom initially only as a means so that, eventually, his interlocutor will come to value wisdom as an end. I show that Plato thinks this transformation can happen by two main mechanisms: the power of repeated arguments to persuade where isolated arguments fail, and the ability of intellectual pleasure to reshape one's fundamental evaluative beliefs. Thus, Socrates' overall strategy is not unlike that of the professor who recruits a student to philosophy with the promise that it will improve her LSAT scores, all the while anticipating that, once the student experiences the thrill of abstract, intellectual inquiry—once she experiences the transformative power of philosophy—she will lose her legal ambitions and devote herself instead to philosophical studies. What justifies this strategy, in our eyes and Plato's, is that, in some important contexts, including the choice of a way of life, the right reasons can come into view only after taking up some practice, and so the practice cannot be motivated by the right reasons until it is taken up on some other basis.